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Pros
 The effects of major trade policy changes on 
aggregate employment are mixed.
 Through its effects on the rest of the economy 
such protection is likely to reduce the jobs 
available in export-oriented sectors.
 Trade reforms do not increase the ratio of 
informal to formal employment.
 Protecting import-competing sectors can 
increase the number of jobs they offer—or at 
least reduce the rate of decline.
eLeVAtOr PitCH
Trade regulation can create jobs in the sectors it 
protects or promotes, but almost always at the 
expense of destroying a roughly equivalent number 
elsewhere in the economy. At a product-specific or 
micro level and in the short term, controlling trade 
could reduce the offending imports and save jobs, but 
for the economy as a whole and in the long term, this 
position has neither theoretical support nor empirical 
evidence in its favor. Given that protection may 
have other—usually adverse—effects, understanding 
the difficulties in using it to manage employment is 
important for economic policy.
AUtHOr’s MAin MessAGe
Trade policy is not an employment policy and should not be expected to have major effects on overall employment. 
When it does so, it is because it interacts with distortions in labor markets, which vary from country to country and 
time to time. No generalization is feasible, and seeking to make one is pretty much a fool’s errand. Policymakers 
wanting to boost employment should think about the aggregate economic balance and labor market institutions, 
and not interfere with international trade.
Cons
 In the long term, trade liberalizations can boost 
employment (at least in developing countries).
 More open economies have higher levels of 
employment, other things being equal.
 Trade reform does not appear to cause large 
reallocations of labor between sectors.
 Trade reform may still cause intrasectoral 
reallocation from less to more efficient firms 
within sectors.
international trade regulation and job creation
Trade policy is not an employment policy and should not be expected 
to have major effects on overall employment
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KeY FinDinGs
Source: World Development Indicators. Online at: http://data.worldbank.
org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.
No relationship between international trade and employment
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MOtiVAtiOn
Imports cause job losses in import-competing sectors, so stopping them seems likely 
to preserve jobs. It is also attractive politics, because it can be presented as politicians 
protecting (note the word) their constituents from harm produced by adverse foreign 
forces over which they have no control. This is all very well, but it ignores the effect that 
protecting Paul has on Peter’s ability to earn a living. Through a variety of well-understood 
mechanisms, protecting some sectors typically harms others and destroys jobs in those 
other sectors, with the result that one ends up with a distorted economy but very little 
change in overall employment.
DisCUssiOn OF PrOs AnD COns
In the simplest versions of the currently prevailing neoclassical model of the economy, 
long-term levels of employment and unemployment are determined by macroeconomic 
variables and labor market institutions, not by trade and not at all by trade policy. So, 
according to this view, trade policy can have no long-term impact on employment levels. 
Even neoclassicists, however, recognize that, in the short term, the level of economic activity 
may be influenced by trade shocks or trade policy changes; they argue, however, that in the 
absence of other changes, the labor market will eventually return to its former equilibrium.
The structuralist school, by contrast, rejects Say’s Law that demand expands to absorb 
supply, and postulates that trade and trade policy shocks can affect employment 
permanently by creating or destroying jobs with little or no adjustment in the sectors of the 
economy not directly affected by the shock [1].
The difference in approach reflects the specific simplifications in different modeling 
strategies, which in turn stem from different perceptions about the speed of adjustment 
and the appropriate time period to analyze. Neoclassical theory focuses on the longer 
say’s Law
Say’s Law is attributed to the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say, who wrote, in A Treatise 
on Political Economy, 1834, “[a] product is no sooner created, than it, from that instant, 
affords a market for other products to the full extent of its own value.” The idea is simply 
that if a product worth $x is produced, a flow of $x revenue is generated. (That is, the 
value is defined by the flow it generates.) That part of the flow which is spent on inputs 
that are purchased for the purpose of production, represents a direct demand, and that 
which is not is paid to the various factors of production used in production (land, labor, 
capital, taxes) as income. Since income is for spending, these people will demand goods 
and services from others of that value and so ultimately all $x is reflected in demand.
The term “Say’s Law” was coined by John Maynard Keynes who summarized it as saying 
“supply creates its own demand” and then challenged it on the grounds that income 
may be saved and thus not enter demand. Those who adhere to the Law, however, would 
argue that savings get re-directed into investment and that eventually even hoarded money 
gets spent.
Say, J.-B. A Treatise on Political Economy: Or the Production, Distribution, and Consumption of Wealth 
(Grigg & Elliot, 1834).
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term. Structuralist theory focuses on time periods short enough that full adjustment has 
not occurred and reminds us that, certainly for the people affected, the adjustment path 
can be sufficiently long and painful to dominate their view of appropriate trade policy.
In fact, the dichotomy need not be as extreme as the previous paragraphs suggest. Theorists 
have modified the neoclassical model to add in the sort of labor market imperfections 
that create unemployment even in equilibrium. Introducing efficiency wages and job 
searches into trade models can lead to multiple equilibria, and predictions about both 
(un)employment and the welfare effects of trade liberalization become qualitatively 
ambiguous [2]. In partial empirical support of more general specifications of the trade 
model, labor turnover and attitudes toward trade liberalization are consistent with the 
existence of these sorts of frictions over significant periods of time.
Unfortunately the heterogeneity of economies and the difficulties of isolating trade policy 
from other policies and from the influence of labor market outcomes make simple statistical 
tests between these two views impossible. So, that leaves partial and approximate results, 
which in turn leave a great deal of room for judgment by policymakers.
Aggregate employment
The more direct empirical evidence, based on panel data, shows that when trade is 
driven primarily by Ricardian comparative advantage (based on technological differences 
between countries), protection increases unemployment rates across countries [3]. Several 
permanent trade liberalizations reveal a striking difference in the short-term and long-
term responsiveness of unemployment to trade liberalization. While the immediate effect 
of reducing trade barriers tends to be a rise in unemployment, the longer term sees the 
reversal of this rise and an eventual decline in unemployment. That is, adjustment takes 
time but, at least in this dimension, offers positive returns in the long term.
ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin comparative advantage
Comparative advantage is the idea that countries will export goods which they can produce 
relatively more cheaply than their partners and import those in which their costs are 
relatively greater (with, possibly, a band of non-traded products in between). The theory 
was formulated by David Ricardo in 1817 in On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation. In his exposition of trade between England and Portugal the differences in relative 
costs arose from the two countries having different patterns of labor productivity across 
industries. In modern usage, we apply the term “Ricardian comparative advantage” to any 
circumstance in which cost differences arise from technological differences in 
productivity patterns regardless of which factor the differences reside in. 
The alternative view of Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin postulates that technology is the 
same in all countries but that countries differ in the proportions with which they are 
endowed with different factors of production. If goods require different factors in different 
proportions from each other, Heckscher and Ohlin were able to show that, say, a good 
requiring relatively more labor would be relatively cheaper in a more labor abundant country 
in the absence of trade and thus would become an export when trade occurred. We use the 
term Heckscher-Ohlin comparative advantage wherever the differences in relative costs are 
postulated to stem from countries’ different endowments of factors.
Ricardo, D. On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. London: John Murray, 1817.
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Where trade is determined more by differences in factor endowments (the Heckscher–
Ohlin framework) than by differences in technology, standard international trade theory 
predicts that in capital-abundant countries trade liberalization will boost the returns 
to capital and (in the simplest form of the model) absolutely reduce those to labor (as 
predicted by the Stolper–Samuelson theorem). If job search frictions are added to the labor 
market, that also produces higher unemployment. In labor-abundant economies, labor is 
the winner from trade liberalization, and the result would be lower unemployment. There 
is weak empirical evidence for these outcomes, but it is dominated by the results in the 
previous paragraph.
The pressure to use trade policy to support employment is probably strongest in developed 
countries, such as those of Europe, and the US. Although trade policy in these economies 
is of a sectoral nature (using sector-specific trade policies to support employment in, say, 
agriculture, steel, or textiles), the evidence from capital-abundant countries hints that there 
may be an aggregate effect, at least for a few years [3]. The key question for the aggregate 
outcome is not whether import competition destroys jobs in the affected sectors, but 
whether the workers displaced are reabsorbed into the workforce reasonably quickly and 
without sacrificing wages too much.
Reemploying displaced workers
The late twentieth-century evidence for the US suggests that trade liberalizations 
disproportionately displaced less-qualified workers from manufacturing, that around 
one-third of those were not reemployed within a few years (the timing is imprecise in this 
work), and that those who were reemployed suffered an average cut in wages of 13% [4]. 
Reemployment was quicker and fuller in the 1990s than the 1980s, which reinforces the 
obvious point that labor market institutions and the general buoyancy of the economy and 
the labor market are major determinants of the speed of reabsorption. The costs to these 
workers should be considered in policy making, but claiming that they are the dominant 
factor is not well justified.
Hitting poor countries
There is no compelling evidence that trade liberalization disproportionately hits the 
weak and the poor in developing countries. Indeed, one can identify cases where trade 
liberalizations have been followed by very rapid growth in employment. The problem, of 
course, is that in these cases much more than trade policy was altered, so attribution is 
inevitably rather cloudy.
Increasing openness
A macroeconomic study shows that increasing openness lay behind much of the dramatic 
decline in the natural rate of unemployment in Singapore [5]. Introducing wage bargaining 
and trade unions into a specific-factors two-sector economy endogenizes the natural rate 
of unemployment (see endogeneity or exogeneity?). Between 1966 and 2000—when the 
openness ratio (the sum of export and import relative to gross domestic product (GDP)) 
increased from about two to nearly three—the relative prices of export goods increased, and 
there was a rapid accumulation of capital in the export sector. Both phenomena increased 
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the marginal product (and, hence, the wage) of labor in terms of non-tradable goods and 
services, and helped to expand overall employment fourfold (as the population doubled).
endogeneity or exogeneity?
Endogenous variables are determined by something within the system being analyzed; 
exogenous ones are determined wholly outside it. In the pure neoclassical model, the 
level of employment is entirely exogenous to international trade considerations, but if the 
model recognizes labor market frictions, it can become endogenous, at least in the short 
term. The distinction is also very important in determining causality. If we find a strong 
association between two variables, but both are endogenous, we don’t know which causes 
which. If, by contrast, we are sure that one is exogenous and that our model includes all 
relevant considerations, we can infer that causation runs from it to the endogenous one.
The direct effects of the accumulation were larger than those of relative prices, although 
the latter, a natural consequence of trade liberalization, are arguably the key causal factor 
behind Singapore’s experience. Even if entrepreneurs invested first and then sought markets 
for their goods, as some have maintained, the home market could never have absorbed the 
quantities, so trade liberalization was the key to selling large quantities without having the 
price fall. The results are robust as to whether either relative prices or accumulation, or 
both, are exogenous or endogenous.
A recent systematic review and meta-study of the literature suggests that, taken overall, 
the empirical results on trade policy reforms and aggregate (un)employment suggest little 
systematic effect [6]. But there is a tendency for studies relating openness to employment 
to find a positive relationship between them.
sectoral employment 
Many sectoral studies show that protection for import-competing sectors or export booms 
for exportable sectors are associated with increases in employment. Translating this into 
broad-based trade liberalizations that boost both imports and exports would suggest 
reallocations of labor from the former to the latter sectors. Mauritius, during its period 
of industrialization, 1971–1991, offers some support for this view. Exportable sectors 
gained employment (and wages), but importable sectors did also, despite the reduction 
in trade barriers appearing to open them to greater competition. The latter fact can be 
attributed to the general equilibrium effects of liberalization (and other policies fostering 
industrialization), which caused the economy to expand strongly. Similar results are found 
elsewhere for several countries—such as Vietnam.
A less optimistic scenario has been found for Brazil’s trade liberalization of the 1990s 
[7]. The tariff cuts on final goods displaced workers from import-competing sectors, 
but exporters failed to absorb these workers, even though they expanded their output. 
Thus, lower product tariffs seemed to accelerate worker transitions into unemployment 
or out of the labor force. The same study, however, found that lower tariffs on inputs into 
manufacturing enhanced employment.
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Sectoral reallocation
For developing countries it is perfectly plausible that both export- and import-competing 
sectors expand with trade liberalization: Industrialization draws workers out of low-level 
subsistence agriculture and into measurable employment in more easily observed and 
often more formal sectors. At least at first, this transfer is not curtailed by wage increases. 
For countries that have already passed the surplus labor stage of development, by contrast, 
the predicted reallocation, coupled with fairly stationary aggregate employment, seems 
more likely.
For this reason it is quite a mystery why trade or trade policy shocks do not generally produce 
large amounts of reallocation. An influential study tests whether trade liberalizations in 25 
middle-income countries had the predicted reallocative effects on employment patterns 
across sectors and in aggregate employment [8]. At the level of nine broad sectors of 
the economy, trade reforms appear, if anything, to reduce the average degree of labor 
reallocation below pre-reform levels and to have little effect in aggregate. If we look at 
the data at a finer level of disaggregation of the manufacturing sector, trade reforms are 
associated with increases in reallocation (although these are small, poorly defined and not 
very robust) and a tendency for aggregate manufacturing employment to fall. Thus, trade 
policies do not seem to have been responsible for the wholesale contraction of sectors, 
although they might have induced structural change within the manufacturing sector as 
the sector as a whole declined.
At face value, those results are a challenge for neoclassical theory, which, after all, 
characterizes the benefits of trade as shrinking import-competing production and 
expanding exportable production [8]. But they are probably explicable in the sample of 
liberalizations examined. As in Mauritius, successful liberalization led to an economic 
expansion that allowed all sectors to survive, if not prosper. And in most cases the reforms 
represented a retreat from import-substituting policies that favored manufacturing, so the 
contraction of employment in manufacturing was not surprising.
The liberalizations varied among themselves in depth, nature, and context, so any 
expectations of finding an ostensibly single uniform effect should not be too high! Did 
countries with greater labor market flexibility have greater reallocations? Apparently not 
[8]. But the active pursuit of policies to encourage intersectoral mobility was effective in 
achieving greater reallocation. Thus, while the failure of the simple theory about trade 
merely shifting resources between sectors and no more should certainly be noted, it is not 
clear that the theory’s basic insights are flawed.
Intersectoral reallocations
Recent theory and empirical work by international trade scholars have started to explore 
intrasectoral responses to trade reforms, which seems to be a perfectly natural outcome 
once it is recognized that firms differ—firm-heterogeneity, in the language of trade scholars. 
Reallocations of labor occur from weaker to stronger firms, often accompanied by the 
latter’s increased investment, higher productivity growth, and more diligent search for 
better labor. This allows strong growth in sectoral output without significant increases in 
sectoral employment. The analysis has also suggested that these interfirm but intrasectoral 
reallocations are frequently associated with an increased demand for skilled labor relative 
to unskilled labor. A seminal study of Mexican firms shows that the export boom that 
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followed the peso devaluation of 1994 induced stronger firms to improve the quality of 
their products and their workforces, and to pay higher wages [9]. In this study, as in many 
others, this effect was used to explain the widening skill premium rather than employment 
levels, but the basic insight clearly translates into the employment space.
Skill intensity
For the impact of the creation of the customs union, MERCOSUR, on Argentinean firms, 
consider a model in which firms choose between two production technologies that differ 
in their skill intensity [10]. In equilibrium there are three types of firm: the skill-intensive 
exporters, the unskilled exporters, and the unskilled domestically oriented firms. A tariff 
reduction in an export market induces more firms to enter and upgrade to the skill-intensive 
technology, increasing the market share of more productive firms. The model appears to 
fit the data quite well.
Extending the model shows that the gains by better firms and their subsequent investment 
generate higher demand for skilled workers and increase the skill premium. This forces 
the least-productive firms to downgrade the skills they seek. Testing the latter model on 
Argentinean firm data exploiting the differential reduction in Brazil’s tariffs across sectors 
shows that small firms downgrade skills, while larger firms upgrade them in response to 
Brazil’s tariff reduction. The net effect on the share of skilled labor is positive and implies 
that one-third of the increase in the employment share of skilled labor in Argentina between 
1992 and 1996 is explained by the reduction in Brazil’s tariffs.
Note that the analysis looks at the reduction of protection in Argentina’s main export 
market, rather than in Argentina itself. But it is the nature of trade agreements such as 
MERCOSUR that in order to win concessions by partners, Argentina has to offer to reduce 
its own protection. This will affect Argentinean import-competing firms, and other results 
in the literature strongly suggest that increasing competition in these sectors will also tend 
to favor stronger over weaker firms, and skilled labor over unskilled labor.
Informal labor
One issue that has attracted policy comment is whether trade liberalization leads to 
greater emphasis on informal rather than formal labor markets. The question is fraught 
with difficulties because one needs to have a clear idea about exactly what informality 
amounts to, which varies by country and study. Even so, the evidence is quite mixed [11]. 
The outcome arguably depends on how flexible labor markets are. If they are inflexible—as 
in Colombia in the later 1980s—firms in expanding sectors will favor informal over formal 
employment because it is cheaper and easier to unwind. But if they are more flexible—as in 
Brazil and Colombia after 1990—this is not true.
LiMitAtiOns AnD GAPs
The analysis is limited by several factors. But it would be fallacious to conclude—from the 
fact that the conclusion that trade policy has little effect on employment has technical 
limitations—that the effect is therefore strong (and of whatever sign one prefers). It is 
still the case that our best efforts in theory and empirics lead us to expect little from 
international trade policy for aggregate employment. The limitations include the following:
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 • There is a danger that trade policy is influenced by labor market outcomes (endogeneity), 
so observing that relationship may be mixed in with whatever influence trade policy 
has on the labor market.
 • Defining overall trade policy stances and aggregate employment presents challenges. 
For example, should skilled jobs be viewed differently from unskilled ones? How 
should one measure the openness of an economy?
 • Much of the effect of trade and trade policy is as likely to be on wages as on employment.
 • The sample of major trade policy changes—those large enough to even conceivably 
have a detectable influence on aggregate employment—is small. It also reflects the 
particular circumstances of the time it occurred (about 1980–2000) and a great deal 
of heterogeneity across cases. So, the external validity of the current literature is far 
from perfect as a guide to future liberalizations.
Measuring the openness of an economy
One would think that identifying an open economy would be easy, but when it comes 
to trying to explain the effects of openness this is not so. The most common measure 
is to consider the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. This is clear, but has the huge 
problem that it is clearly likely to respond to, as well as influence, the level of employment—
if employment increased for some extraneous reason, output would increase and so, too, 
in all probability would exports. Thus, in carrying out research on the effects of openness 
researchers have to resort to other measures that are less likely to show such sensitivity.
One such is the average tariff, which is again nice and clear. However, if you use a simple 
unweighted average, you are applying the same weight to the tariff on shoelaces as to that 
on passenger cars. If, however, you decide to weight the tariffs by the value of imports they 
apply to you get a bias, because, holding everything else the same, the higher the tariff, 
the lower the imports. (Imagine an infinite tariff; it would allow no imports and so get a 
zero weight in this calculation.) Besides, lots more affects openness than tariffs: non-tariff 
barriers, the volatility of the exchange rate, the quality of the ports and customs, etc. 
A compromise measure used quite frequently is a qualitative measure which counts an 
economy as closed if any of the following applies: it has average tariff rates higher than 
40%; its non-tariff barriers cover on average more than 40% of imports; it has a socialist 
economic system; it has a state monopoly of major exports, or its black-market premium 
exceeds 20%. This is rich, but clearly entails a number of arbitrary thresholds and makes no 
allowance for what, say, socialist governments or export monopolists actually do.  
While in many cases all these various indicators of openness will tell the same story, 
the difficulties of measuring openness should caution us against relying on the precise 
magnitudes that researchers claim for the effects of openness.
sUMMArY AnD POLiCY ADViCe
The effects of major trade policy changes on aggregate employment are mixed, although 
there is evidence that, in the long term, trade liberalizations boost employment (at least 
in developing countries) and that more open economies have higher levels of employment, 
other things being equal. Indeed, one can identify cases where trade liberalizations have 
been followed by very rapid growth in employment. The problem, of course, is that 
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in these cases much more than just trade policy was altered, so attribution is inevitably 
rather cloudy.
Protecting import-competing sectors can increase the number of jobs they offer—or at 
least reduce the rate of decline. But such protection, through its effects on the rest of the 
economy, is likely to reduce the jobs available in export-oriented sectors.
Trade policy is not an employment policy and should not be expected to have major effects 
on overall employment. When it does, the reason is that it interacts with distortions in 
labor markets, which vary from country to country and time to time. While the immediate 
effect of reducing trade barriers tends to be a rise in unemployment, the longer term sees 
the reversal of this rise and an eventual decline in unemployment. That is, adjustment takes 
time, but, at least in this dimension, offers positive returns in the long term.
Where trade is determined more by differences in factor endowments than by differences 
in technology, theory predicts that in capital-abundant countries trade liberalization will 
boost the returns to capital and absolutely reduce those to labor. If job search frictions are 
added to the labor market, the latter effect also produces higher unemployment. In labor-
abundant economies, labor is the winner from trade liberalization, and the result would be 
lower unemployment.
The key question for the aggregate outcome is not whether import competition destroys 
jobs in the affected sectors, but whether the workers displaced are reabsorbed into the 
workforce reasonably quickly and without sacrificing wages too much.
Many sectoral studies show that protection for import-competing sectors or export booms 
for exportable sectors are associated with increases in employment. Translating this into 
broad-based trade liberalizations that boost both imports and exports would suggest 
reallocations of labor from the former to the latter sectors. Trade reform does not appear 
to cause large reallocations of labor between sectors, but it may still cause intrasectoral 
reallocation from less to more efficient firms within sectors. Reallocations of labor occur 
from weaker to stronger firms, often accompanied by the latter’s increased investment, 
higher productivity growth, and more diligent search for better labor.
The policy message of this work is clear: Do not expect international trade policy to 
have major or even possibly predictable effects on aggregate employment. Policymakers 
concerned about employment levels should think about the aggregate economic balance 
and labor market institutions, and not interfere with international trade.
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